Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to celebrate Diwali with security personnel at the CoBRA Operations Base in Karanpur, Bastar, Chhattisgarh, was much more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity with the men and women guarding the nation. It carried a larger national security message: while India may have turned a decisive corner in its decades-long battle against armed Naxalism, the challenge of confronting the ideology, networks and support systems that sustained the insurgency cannot be ignored.
Standing among the commandos who spearheaded operations against Maoist insurgents in some of the country’s most hostile terrains, Modi declared that this was the first Diwali in which every district of India was free from Naxalism. The significance of the announcement should not be underestimated. For decades, Maoist violence had held entire regions hostage, denied tribal communities basic development, disrupted democratic processes and exacted a terrible price from security personnel and innocent civilians. The Prime Minister acknowledged the sacrifices of the forces and credited their determination, alongside focused development initiatives, for this transformation. <FileCite ref_id=”turn619689search2″ />
But is the battle really over? The end of organised armed insurgency must not be mistaken for the disappearance of its ideological influence or the networks that may have enabled it. If the jungle hideouts have been dismantled, the country must remain vigilant against attempts to revive the movement through propaganda, recruitment, financial support and political patronage.
This is where the next phase of India’s internal security challenge becomes important. Often described as the battle against ‘Dimagi Naxalism’, it concerns the ideological and logistical ecosystem that can provide oxygen to extremist violence even when its armed cadres have been neutralised. However, such a challenge demands intelligence-led investigation and credible evidence, not indiscriminate labelling of dissent, civil society organisations or critics of the government. Legitimate democratic disagreement must never be confused with support for violence.
The critical questions are unavoidable. Who financed the insurgency? Who facilitated the flow of resources and weapons? Were there organised networks providing propaganda, recruitment and logistical assistance? Did any individuals or institutions knowingly facilitate violence while operating behind respectable public platforms? These questions deserve thorough investigation wherever credible evidence exists. Accountability must extend beyond the gunman in the forest to those who knowingly enabled the violence.
The geopolitical dimension of national security is equally significant. The unfolding controversy surrounding Nvidia chief Jensen Huang and allegations of a possible Chinese intelligence connection illustrates how technology, commercial interests and strategic competition increasingly overlap. Reports of a US intelligence assessment concerning an alleged information-gathering operation involving Huang have triggered an independent investigation by Nvidia’s board. The allegations remain contested, and no conclusion of wrongdoing has been established.
The controversy also raises uncomfortable questions about Washington’s approach to advanced semiconductor exports to China. Huang has advocated allowing Nvidia to sell certain chips to the Chinese market, while US export policy has periodically permitted limited sales under regulatory conditions. Whether commercial lobbying, intelligence assessments and strategic calculations have intersected in this episode deserves scrutiny. But speculation about a grand conspiracy should not be presented as established fact.
For India, the lesson is clear. National security in the 21st century cannot be confined to territorial defence or counter-insurgency operations. Technology transfers, foreign funding, information warfare, digital propaganda and transnational networks can all have strategic consequences. Vigilance must therefore extend to emerging threats without compromising institutional transparency or democratic freedoms.
Modi’s Bastar visit was thus a celebration of a significant security achievement, but also a reminder that peace must be consolidated. The government has to ensure that the vacuum left by Maoist violence is filled with schools, healthcare, connectivity, employment and genuine economic opportunity for tribal communities. Development is not merely a welfare promise; it is an essential instrument of lasting internal security.
The guns may have fallen silent, but the responsibility of safeguarding the gains remains. Those who believe that extremist violence can be resurrected through covert funding, ideological manipulation or foreign assistance must understand that the state cannot afford complacency. At the same time, the pursuit of such networks must be governed by law and evidence.
India has an opportunity to close a dark chapter of its internal security history. The next test is to ensure that Naxalism does not return in another guise. The jungle battle may be over; the battle for minds, institutions and national security is not.
