The judiciary is supposed to be the last refuge of the common citizen when the legislature fails to make the right laws and the executive fails to enforce them fairly. That is precisely why the latest signs of institutional friction within the higher judiciary should concern every citizen—not merely the legal fraternity.
The question is no longer whether Bharat’s judiciary enjoys constitutional authority. It unquestionably does. The uncomfortable question is whether it is slowly losing the public confidence that gives that authority its moral strength.
The latest controversy surrounding an apparent “letters war” among Supreme Court judges and the Chief Justice over the appointment of Chief Justices of certain High Courts has once again exposed the fault lines within the institution. When differences among senior judges spill into the public domain, the issue cannot simply be dismissed as an internal administrative matter. The judiciary derives much of its credibility from the perception that it is impartial, institutionally disciplined and above factional considerations.
And this is hardly the first warning.
In January 2018, four senior-most Supreme Court judges—J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph—held an unprecedented press conference raising questions about the administration of the Supreme Court under then Chief Justice Dipak Misra, particularly the allocation of sensitive cases. The episode shook public confidence because it exposed an extraordinary level of disagreement within the country’s highest court.
That history should not be forgotten merely because the personalities have changed.
The present concerns are wider than any individual judge or Chief Justice. Questions surrounding case allocation, judicial transfers, the functioning of the Collegium and the absence of adequate transparency have repeatedly surfaced. The Collegium system itself has survived years of criticism precisely because an institution exercising enormous constitutional power must also be able to explain, in credible terms, how and why consequential decisions are taken.
The irony is difficult to miss.
The judiciary routinely demands transparency and accountability from the executive and legislature. It rightly scrutinises government decisions, protects constitutional rights and intervenes when other institutions cross their limits. But the same principle of institutional accountability must apply internally as well.
What is good for democracy outside the courtroom cannot be bad for the judiciary inside it.
At the same time, it would be intellectually dishonest to conclude that every disagreement among judges represents institutional collapse. Dissent can be healthy. Indeed, an independent judiciary must have room for disagreement. Internal debate can sometimes be a mechanism through which an institution corrects itself.
But there is a crucial distinction between healthy judicial dissent and persistent institutional dysfunction.
That distinction matters because the judiciary does not operate in a vacuum. Its credibility ultimately rests on public confidence. A litigant who waits years for justice, watches cases being repeatedly adjourned and confronts an opaque legal system is unlikely to be reassured merely by constitutional theory.
The deeper crisis, therefore, lies below the headlines.
Bharat’s courts continue to struggle with enormous case backlogs, vacancies, inadequate infrastructure and delays, particularly at the subordinate-court level. For an ordinary citizen, justice delayed is not an abstract institutional problem. It can mean years of uncertainty, financial exhaustion and emotional trauma.
The judiciary cannot afford to become another institution that citizens approach with resignation rather than hope.
There is also a larger constitutional principle at stake. The legislature, executive and judiciary are not competing empires. They are three pillars of the same constitutional structure. If one pillar weakens, the entire structure is endangered. The judiciary, however, occupies a special position in public perception because it is expected to be the neutral arbiter when the other two pillars fail.
That makes its credibility priceless.
Bharat does not need a judiciary that is infallible. No human institution can be. It needs a judiciary that is independent without being opaque, powerful without being unaccountable, and internally divided on questions of law without appearing institutionally divided on questions of administration.
The solution is not political interference. Quite the opposite.
It is greater institutional transparency, clearer administrative procedures, credible mechanisms for addressing internal disagreements and a serious assault on the culture of endless delay.
The judiciary must also understand one uncomfortable truth: constitutional authority cannot by itself manufacture public trust.
Trust has to be earned—case by case, judgment by judgment and institution by institution.
Bharat’s judiciary has been one of the strongest safeguards of constitutional democracy. It must remain so.
But if the people begin asking whether the institution that is supposed to deliver justice is itself struggling to put its house in order, that question cannot be brushed aside as an attack on judicial independence.
It should instead be treated as a wake-up call.
Because when the legislature disappoints and the executive falters, citizens turn to the courts.
If the last refuge begins to look uncertain, where does the citizen go?
