Historically, India lived with the behemoth that was the Congress party. While several other political parties coexisted with strong ideological identities of their own, they largely remained also-rans, unable to surpass the Congress. However, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the emergence of a genuine multi-party system, with new political formations and organised opposition groups entering the electoral arena.
Unlike countries such as the Soviet Union and China, which followed a one-party model, or the United States and Canada, which function largely under a two-party system, India evolved into a vibrant multi-party democracy. Despite ideological differences and political instability, the system largely succeeded in accommodating the aspirations of an extraordinarily diverse society. Life was far from prosperous—poverty was widespread and life expectancy was low—but democracy remained remarkably resilient.
India then had a population of about 36 crore. Today, that figure stands at nearly 147 crore, making India the world’s most populous nation with almost one-fifth of humanity living within its borders. While our geography has remained unchanged, our political landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation. Unlike China, whose expansionist tendencies have periodically challenged India’s territorial integrity since the 1960s, India has remained territorially stable while becoming politically far more complex.
Regional parties emerged as the principal force that dismantled single-party dominance and ushered in the era of coalition politics. By challenging the excessive centralisation of power, particularly after the Emergency, they reshaped India’s political landscape through cooperative federalism, decentralised governance and greater regional representation.
The formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under the BJP in 1998 and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under the Congress in 2004 institutionalised coalition politics at the national level. Both alliances depended significantly on regional parties for stability and survival.
Yet, national politics continued to revolve around towering personalities. Leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee dominated the national imagination, leaving regional parties with little choice but to align themselves with one of the two national poles. At the state level, however, many regional leaders cultivated their own version of the TINA (There Is No Alternative) phenomenon. Leaders like Nitish Kumar in Bihar and N. Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh became politically indispensable in their respective states, much as Narendra Modi has become at the national level.
Ironically, it has often been regional parties that have enabled stable governments at the Centre. Their numerical strength has repeatedly proved decisive in government formation. Even during the minority government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao, political pragmatism triumphed over ideological rigidity. Rao successfully brought together parties with sharply divergent views on issues of national importance, particularly economic reforms under the LPG model—Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation—which fundamentally altered India’s economic trajectory.
Both national parties have, at different times, pursued policies they believed were in India’s larger interest. Regional parties have alternately acted as stabilising partners and troublesome allies. Whenever no national party secured an absolute majority, coalition compulsions often forced concessions, political bargaining and, at times, outright blackmail by regional partners—many of which were themselves family-run organisations.
For years, this arrangement functioned reasonably well. Regional parties governed their respective states, while the Centre depended on their parliamentary support. In return, the states expected financial assistance and political accommodation. It was an imperfect but workable model of Indian federalism.
The equation changed once national parties realised that many regional parties had weakened themselves through dynastic politics, narrow regional agendas and self-serving leadership. Both the Congress and the BJP perfected the art of embracing regional parties when they needed them and marginalising them once they acquired comfortable parliamentary majorities. Regional parties, too, seldom hesitated to extract their political price for extending support. The resulting transactional politics often strained Centre-State relations.
The Congress attempted to weaken regional parties whenever it enjoyed parliamentary dominance in the hope of regaining lost states. The BJP has similarly sought to expand its footprint across the country and today governs, either directly or through alliances, in a majority of states while leading the government at the Centre.
Regional parties, meanwhile, have often failed to acknowledge their own organisational weaknesses. Instead, they blame the national parties for systematically undermining them. While there is merit in this criticism, their own internal contradictions cannot be ignored. Whether it is the decline of the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi, the Bharat Rashtra Samithi in Telangana, or the political pressures faced by the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, the growing dominance of national parties has become increasingly evident. Even in Tamil Nadu, where the DMK remains politically formidable, electoral arithmetic changes significantly during Lok Sabha elections because of national alliances.
Controversies over Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, allegations of vote manipulation, accusations against the Election Commission, and periodic interventions by the Supreme Court have only reinforced the perception among several regional parties that the national political space is gradually shrinking in favour of the BJP and the Congress.
This raises an intriguing question. Is India gradually moving towards a de facto two-party system? Or could regional parties collectively reinvent TINA—not as “There Is No Alternative” centred on an individual leader, but as “There Is a National Alternative” built through a broad coalition of regional forces?
The Congress’ inability to emerge as a robust national challenger has undoubtedly strengthened the BJP’s position. Yet anti-incumbency remains an enduring feature of Indian politics. Could regional parties seize that opportunity by setting aside their differences and presenting a credible national platform before the 2029 general election?
Such an idea may appear ambitious, even improbable. Yet Indian politics has repeatedly produced unexpected outcomes. The rapid rise of actor-turned-politician Vijay in Tamil Nadu illustrates how quickly political equations can change. A younger generation of regional leaders could eventually replace ageing leadership while retaining the elders as mentors, thereby injecting fresh energy into regional politics.
Equally possible is another scenario: the BJP could continue absorbing influential regional leaders and organisations, gradually transforming itself into an even broader national platform. Alternatively, regional parties could unite to create a genuinely federal alternative that challenges both national parties.
Ultimately, the choice will rest with India’s voters in 2029. Will they continue with a familiar national party? Will they embrace a reinvented coalition of regional forces? Or will Indian politics produce yet another unexpected alternative?
As always in Indian democracy, the electorate alone holds the magic wand.
