Special Correspondent
The latest Telangana High Court order is significant — but perhaps not for the reasons being claimed by either side
When the Hyderabad Cricket Association (HCA) enters a courtroom, it is rarely just another legal proceeding. Given the association’s long history of disputes, competing claims, administrative controversies and interventions by courts and cricketing authorities, every new order tends to acquire a life of its own.
The latest Telangana High Court Division Bench order is no exception.
Some may see it as a setback for the HCA. Others may describe it as a victory for the complainants. Still others may dismiss it as merely another procedural development in an endless chain of litigation.
All three interpretations, however, risk missing the real significance of the order.
The Division Bench has not decided who is right on the substantive allegations against the HCA. It has not pronounced the complaint proved. It has not ruled that the HCA is guilty of any wrongdoing. Nor has it finally determined that the BCCI Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the substantive dispute.
What the court has essentially said is simpler — and, in the context of institutional governance, quite important:
Let the Ombudsman first decide whether the complaint is maintainable before proceeding to its merits.
That distinction is central to understanding the entire controversy.
How did the dispute reach this stage?
The matter originated in a complaint placed before the BCCI Ombudsman under the grievance-redressal mechanism contained in the BCCI’s Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations.
The Ombudsman issued notice and the HCA appeared before the forum. The HCA did not merely ignore the complaint. It filed its response and raised a preliminary objection questioning the maintainability of the proceedings.
That is an important procedural fact.
A party facing a complaint is perfectly entitled to contend that the complaint is not maintainable, that the forum lacks jurisdiction, or that the dispute does not fall within the relevant rules.
Indeed, the BCCI’s own framework provides for grievance redressal through the Ombudsman, including disputes involving the association, its members and other specified stakeholders. The BCCI’s official Ombudsman page also records multiple orders issued during 2026, including an August 4 order relating to Dharam Guruva Reddy of Telangana Cricket Association.
The HCA’s objection, therefore, was not in itself something extraordinary.
The real issue was what happened next.
The procedural detour
According to the High Court order, the Ombudsman had posted the matter for further hearing. Before the Ombudsman could render a ruling on the HCA’s preliminary objection to maintainability, the HCA approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The writ court subsequently granted an interim stay on further proceedings before the Ombudsman.
The complainants challenged that intervention before the Division Bench.
This produced the order that has now become the centre of the discussion.
The Division Bench noted that the HCA had already appeared before the Ombudsman and filed its counter-affidavit raising the preliminary objection. The Bench further noted that the Ombudsman had not yet ruled on that objection when the HCA approached the writ court.
That sequence matters.
What exactly did the Division Bench say?
The court was careful not to enter the merits.
It expressly stated that it was not required, at that stage, to comment upon the merits of either the complaint or the objection concerning maintainability because both issues were pending before the appropriate forums.
This is perhaps the most important part of the order.
In other words, the court did not say: “the complaint is valid.”
Nor did it say: “the HCA has committed the alleged violations.”
And equally, it did not say: “the HCA is right and the complaint is baseless.”
Instead, the court concentrated on the procedural question of whether the Ombudsman should first be allowed to determine the preliminary objection placed before it.
The answer was yes.
The Division Bench found that the appellants had made out a prima facie case and stayed the earlier interim order that had halted the Ombudsman proceedings. It directed the Ombudsman to decide the preliminary objection before proceeding to hear the matter on merits.
That is the judicial position at this stage.
Nothing more should be read into it.
Why does “maintainability” matter?
For the ordinary reader, “maintainability” can sound like legal jargon.
It is not a technicality without consequence.
Before an authority examines whether allegations are true, it may first have to determine whether the complaint can legally be entertained before it.
Does the dispute fall within the authority’s jurisdiction?
Is the complainant entitled to invoke that mechanism?
Does the particular grievance fall within the categories covered by the governing rules?
These are threshold questions.
Only after such questions are answered can the substantive allegations be considered, assuming the complaint survives that preliminary stage.
The Division Bench’s direction essentially preserves that sequence.
Does this mean the Ombudsman has unquestionable jurisdiction?
No.
That would be another incorrect reading of the order.
The court specifically directed the Ombudsman to decide the HCA’s preliminary objection. That means the jurisdictional or maintainability issue remains alive.
The Ombudsman must first consider the objection and decide it.
If the complaint is found maintainable, the substantive matter can then proceed in accordance with law.
If it is found not maintainable, the consequences will obviously be different.
Therefore, declaring today that the Ombudsman has conclusively established jurisdiction would be premature.
The court has instead ensured that the question is decided by the forum before which the objection was originally raised.
And what about the argument that the HCA had a right to approach the High Court?
It did.
Article 226 gives High Courts broad constitutional jurisdiction. The existence of an alternative remedy does not automatically and in every circumstance extinguish writ jurisdiction.
Indeed, earlier Telangana High Court decisions concerning HCA disputes have recognised both the existence of the Ombudsman mechanism and the circumstances in which writ jurisdiction may still be invoked.
But that is different from saying that every intervention at every stage is necessarily justified.
In the present matter, the Division Bench considered the timing significant: the HCA had already raised its maintainability objection before the Ombudsman, yet approached the writ court before that objection was decided.
The Bench considered that the Ombudsman ought to have been allowed to rule on the preliminary objection first.
That is a measured judicial position, not a sweeping condemnation of the HCA’s legal rights.
The bigger lesson
There is a larger principle here that goes beyond Hyderabad cricket.
Institutions create grievance-redressal mechanisms for a reason.
If every preliminary disagreement immediately becomes a fresh constitutional litigation, internal and specialised mechanisms can become practically meaningless.
At the same time, such mechanisms must themselves operate fairly and within the rules.
That means both sides have responsibilities.
The complainant cannot assume that filing a complaint amounts to establishing wrongdoing.
The respondent cannot assume that challenging jurisdiction automatically brings the proceedings to an end.
And the authority hearing the dispute must decide the threshold questions before moving to the substantive allegations.
That is precisely the stage at which the matter now stands.
So, who won?
Perhaps the most accurate answer is: nobody has won the substantive battle yet.
The complainants have not obtained a finding on the allegations.
The HCA has not obtained a finding that the complaint is not maintainable.
The Ombudsman has been directed to first decide the preliminary objection.
The High Court has restored that process.
The court has also directed that the State of Telangana be impleaded in the appeal and the Union of India be deleted from the array of respondents, with the matter listed for September 28, 2026.
That is where the matter stands.
And perhaps there is something refreshing about stating it plainly.
In an environment where every court order is quickly converted into a “victory” by one side and a “defeat” for the other, the responsible approach is to read what the court actually said.
The latest order is about procedure before verdict.
It is about allowing the Ombudsman to answer the threshold question before the substantive dispute is examined.
And that brings us to the more uncomfortable question.
Why does the HCA find itself repeatedly caught in disputes that move from the cricket field to the boardroom, from the boardroom to the Ombudsman and from the Ombudsman to the courts?
That is not merely a legal question.
It is a question about governance.
And that is where the second part of this series begins.
