Should India accept the United States’ invitation to join Pax Silica as a permanent member? At first glance, the offer appears flattering—almost overdue. But scratch beneath the diplomatic varnish, and the invitation looks less like strategic generosity and more like a reluctant concession from a power that has suddenly realised it can no longer dictate terms to a rising civilisational state.
The timing alone raises eyebrows.
The US ambassador-designate Sergio Gor, during his latest visit, appeared to dangle a carefully crafted bait before an evidently unimpressed New Delhi. He claimed to have met President Donald Trump, only to return with assurances that Washington was now ready to invite India into Pax Silica as a permanent member—alongside a conveniently “softened” stance on trade tariffs, with talks allegedly set to be rescheduled.
This charm offensive, however, came barely days after Trump publicly declared that the “doors are shut” on trade negotiations with India and repeated threats of punitive tariffs—figures so exaggerated that they bordered on economic intimidation rather than policy. To make matters worse, one of Trump’s aides crossed a red line by peddling a crude falsehood: that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had supposedly called Trump, pleading for an audience with a deferential, almost colonial “Sir, can I come and meet you?”
That narrative didn’t just insult the Indian Prime Minister—it insulted 140 crore Indians who understand exactly who Modi is, what he represents, and how India conducts itself on the world stage. Predictably, the Ministry of External Affairs responded swiftly and firmly, rejecting the claim and reminding Washington that India’s Prime Minister has never, and will never, use undignified or submissive language with any world leader—least of all one who oscillates between bluster and bravado.
The message from New Delhi was unmistakable: Do not mistake India’s restraint for weakness. Do not confuse engagement with subservience.
Under Narendra Modi, India does not bend, crawl, or prostrate—no matter how powerful the other nation claims to be. New Bharat engages the world as an equal, not as a supplicant. There are no “superpowers” at the table—only sovereign states.
This context is critical when assessing Washington’s Pax Silica invitation.
Trump’s second coming to the White House has been marked by unpredictability bordering on recklessness. His rhetoric has grown harsher, his economic threats more impulsive, and his worldview increasingly transactional. The aftermath of Operation Sindoor—India’s decisive military response against its rogue neighbour following the brutal killing of innocent tourists—appears to have further unsettled Washington. India didn’t seek permission. It didn’t wait for approval. It acted.
That, more than anything else, seems to have jolted the US strategic establishment.
And so, Pax Silica enters the picture.
For all its lofty language, Pax Silica is a US-led strategic initiative aimed at securing the future of the silicon and AI supply chain—critical minerals, energy inputs, semiconductor fabrication, AI infrastructure, and high-end logistics. In short, it is about controlling the technologies that will define power in the 21st century.
The irony is hard to miss.
The inaugural Pax Silica Summit deliberately excluded India—a decision driven less by logic and more by Trumpian arrogance. The original participants included Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Netherlands, the UK, Israel, the UAE, and Australia, with guest contributions from Taiwan, the European Union, Canada, and the OECD. These countries indeed host major players in semiconductors and AI—but none possess India’s scale, talent depth, cost advantage, or democratic legitimacy.
US officials later attempted damage control, insisting that selection was based on “current roles” in supply chains and that discussions with India were “separate” and ongoing. India, they said, remained a “highly strategic potential partner.”
That phrase—potential partner—said more about Washington’s mindset than it intended.
Because the truth is this: the United States cannot afford to ignore India any longer.
India today is not merely a consumer of technology—it is a producer, innovator, and incubator. It is aggressively nurturing its own AI ecosystem, encouraging domestic startups, investing in semiconductor fabrication, and safeguarding critical and rare mineral supply chains. At the same time, Trump’s self-destructive immigration policies—drastic H-1B restrictions and absurdly inflated visa fees—have begun reversing decades of American advantage by pushing Indian talent back home.
What Washington once took for granted—Indian brains powering American innovation—is now strengthening India’s own technological sovereignty. That is not an accident. It is policy.
In that light, Pax Silica looks less like an invitation and more like an admission of dependency.
So, should India accept?
Yes—but only on India’s terms.
New Delhi must not allow this invitation to dilute or divert its independent focus on AI leadership, rare earth security, or indigenous manufacturing. Nor should India tie its strategic future to the whims of an erratic US President whose statements change with the news cycle.
India should engage Pax Silica transactionally, cautiously, and confidently—extracting technology access, supply-chain resilience, and market leverage, while retaining full strategic autonomy. Partnership must never become alignment by default.
The age of India being “managed” by Washington is over.
If Pax Silica recognises India as an equal stakeholder—respects its sovereignty, strategic choices, and civilisational confidence—then participation makes sense. If it is merely another instrument of pressure disguised as partnership, India must have the courage to walk away.
New Bharat does not chase tables. The table comes to Bharat.
