Few geopolitical questions today are as volatile—or as selectively interpreted—as China’s claim over Taiwan. Beijing insists that reunification is inevitable, lawful, and historically ordained. Much of the world urges restraint, dialogue, and maintenance of the status quo. Between these positions lies a hard truth: there is no single, universally accepted answer—only competing narratives, legal interpretations, and political priorities. From Beijing’s perspective, the claim is rooted in history. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees itself as the successor state to the Republic of China (ROC) following the Chinese Civil War of 1949. Taiwan, where the ROC government retreated, is therefore viewed as unfinished business of a civil war interrupted—not concluded. This belief underpins China’s “One China” principle, a diplomatic precondition for relations with Beijing and one acknowledged, in varying language, by most countries. China has further fortified its position through domestic legislation. The 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorises the use of “non-peaceful means” should Taiwan formally declare independence or if peaceful reunification becomes impossible. From Beijing’s legal lens, therefore, force is not aggression but the enforcement of sovereignty. Yet Taiwan’s reality diverges sharply from Beijing’s narrative. For over seven decades, Taiwan has functioned as a self-governing democracy with its own constitution, armed forces, judiciary, and freely elected governments. Its people vote, protest, and change governments—none of which occurs under the PRC’s authoritarian system. Crucially, the majority of Taiwan’s 23 million citizens oppose unification under China’s proposed “one country, two systems” model, particularly after witnessing its erosion in Hong Kong. History, too, complicates China’s claim. Taiwan’s trajectory includes Japanese colonial rule, a separate post-war administration, and relative isolation from the mainland’s political upheavals. This has fostered a distinct political identity. Many Taiwanese do not identify as exclusively Chinese, and increasingly assert that only Taiwan’s people have the right to determine Taiwan’s future.
International law offers no neat resolution. While the United Nations recognised the PRC as the sole representative of China under Resolution 2758, it did not explicitly define Taiwan’s sovereignty. Several legal scholars argue that post-World War II treaties failed to transfer Taiwan’s sovereignty to any specific entity, leaving its status ambiguous and strengthening arguments for self-determination rather than automatic absorption. The global community, therefore, hedges. Most countries “acknowledge” or “take note of” China’s claim without endorsing it. The prevailing preference is stability—preserving the status quo and opposing any unilateral change by force. This caution is not purely moral. A military conflict over Taiwan would devastate global supply chains, disrupt critical shipping lanes, and cripple the semiconductor industry that underpins modern economies. Ultimately, whether Chinese aggression is “justified” depends on what one prioritises: territorial integrity and historical continuity, or democratic consent and self-determination. There is no global consensus—only strategic ambiguity. This is where the question becomes uncomfortable for the international order. If historical claims and successor-state logic justify Beijing’s stance on Taiwan, then by extension, similar arguments apply elsewhere. India, for instance, maintains a long-standing legal and constitutional claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory that was unlawfully seized in 1947 and continues to be held by force. Unlike Taiwan, PoK lacks democratic autonomy, faces systemic rights violations, and has never been allowed genuine self-expression. Yet the world urges restraint from India while urging dialogue with China—revealing a selective application of principles. Sovereignty, it seems, is defended or diluted based on power equations, not consistency. If force is condemned in one case, it must be condemned in all. And if history is allowed to justify claims in East Asia, it cannot be dismissed outright in South Asia. Anything else is not international law—it is geopolitical convenience.
