Washington’s latest chest-thumping over India’s energy policy says more about American political theatre than any seismic shift in New Delhi’s strategic calculus.
US President Donald Trump is now claiming that India had agreed to immediately halt purchases of Russian oil and instead divert energy imports—reportedly worth $500 billion—towards the United States or Venezuela. He coupled this assertion with an announcement that US tariffs on Indian goods would be reduced from 25 per cent to 18 per cent, projecting it as a diplomatic win forced through personal negotiation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Yet there is a glaring problem: India has confirmed none of this.
Neither Prime Minister Modi nor Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has acknowledged any such assurance on Russian energy imports. On the contrary, New Delhi’s response has been conspicuous for its restraint—silence until the “fine print” of any trade agreement is formally concluded. In diplomacy, that silence is not weakness; it is leverage.
The White House, however, appears far more jubilant than India. Senior US officials went further, claiming India had opened its markets to American agricultural products. That assertion was promptly rebutted by Goyal, who clarified that while limited imports such as nuts and dry fruits could be considered, India would not compromise its farming community, which sustains over 600 million livelihoods. Similar firmness was displayed on textiles and other sensitive sectors.
Despite this, India’s Opposition—led by the Congress party, increasingly detached from ground realities—rushed to brand the Modi government’s posture as a “surrender”. The irony is hard to miss: even US economists have admitted that Trump extracted little of substance from these negotiations.
The Kremlin, meanwhile, quietly dismantled Washington’s narrative.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated unambiguously that Moscow has no objection if India purchases oil from other suppliers and reaffirmed that Indo-Russian energy cooperation remains “beneficial to both countries” and stabilising for global markets. Russian business radio Kommersant FM also noted a crucial detail: Modi never mentioned any commitment to stop buying Russian oil, unlike Trump’s unilateral proclamations.
Until 2021, Russian crude accounted for a negligible 0.2 per cent of India’s oil imports. That changed only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when Western sanctions forced Moscow to offer deep discounts. India—now the world’s third-largest oil importer—stepped in, not as a geopolitical favour, but as a rational economic decision.
India imports about 88 per cent of its crude oil. At its peak, Russian supplies crossed 2 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-third of India’s total imports. Even after US pressure and tariff threats, India still imported around 1.1–1.3 million bpd in recent months, according to data from analytics firm Kpler.

To put it bluntly: Russian oil is not easily replaceable.
Energy expert Igor Yushkov of the National Energy Security Fund explains why. Russian Urals crude is heavy and sulphur-rich, ideally suited for Indian refineries. US shale oil, by contrast, is light crude, closer to gas condensate. Substituting Russian oil with American barrels would require blending with other grades—raising costs and eroding refinery efficiency.
Moreover, Russia typically exports 1.5–2 million bpd to India. “America simply cannot cover that volume,” Yushkov noted, adding that Trump’s rhetoric appears aimed more at declaring victory than reshaping energy flows.
History backs this assessment. When Russia redirected oil to Asia in 2022, it cut production by 1 million bpd, sending global prices soaring to $120 per barrel. The result? Record gasoline and diesel prices in the US—a political nightmare Washington has no desire to repeat.
Trump has now floated the idea of similar “understandings” with China and announced a prospective visit to Beijing in April. The ambition is clear: distance India and China from Russia. The feasibility is not.
Energy security is not negotiated through press conferences. It is dictated by price, compatibility, supply stability, and national interest. On all four counts, Russia remains a critical supplier for India.
In the end, the question is not whether Washington can spin a narrative, but who controls the market realities. And on that front, the last laugh may well belong to Moscow, not the White House.
