The euphoric coverage by visual media over the ceasefire announcement is not just premature—it is myopic, purblind, and strategically wasteful.
It’s never too late to learn from the annals of military history. But history shows, time and again, that humanity rarely does. To borrow Bismarck’s famous words: “Fools learn from their own mistakes; wise men learn from the mistakes of others.” I would expand this: “Idiots refuse to learn even from their own.”
The adage holds: “Armies win battles, but nations lose wars.” Nowhere is this more apt than in the case of modern India.
In the 1947–48 war, Indian forces were on the verge of evicting Pakistan-sponsored raiders from Jammu & Kashmir, but India lost the war by rushing to the United Nations.
In 1965, our armed forces were poised to crush the Pakistan Army. Yet, the war was lost diplomatically at Tashkent through a Soviet-brokered agreement. Lal Bahadur Shastri’s body returned, but so did India’s lost opportunity.
In 1971, India achieved a resounding battlefield victory. Our forces captured 93,000 Pakistani soldiers. But once again, the strategic advantage was squandered at Shimla—POWs released without securing any substantial guarantees.
Laymen must understand: tactical success is not the same as strategic victory. Armies can win engagements, but nations still lose wars due to political missteps, economic fragility, or lack of long-term vision.
A battle is a single military engagement; a war is a prolonged geopolitical conflict involving politics, economics, public will, and even technology. Confusing the two is fatal.
Prime Minister Modi and his core team—Dr. S. Jaishankar, Rajnath Singh, Ajit Doval, the CDS, and the three service chiefs must not squander this opportunity with a hasty ceasefire. Pakistan’s military was on the verge of collapse. Why stop now?
The Indian Navy, for instance, should have been allowed to strike Karachi and Gwadar ports—crippling their infrastructure and asserting dominance at sea. More importantly, we should have seized the opportunity to neutralize their nuclear infrastructure before they regroup.
From a long-term strategic lens, what Pakistan has offered is not peace—it’s a tactical pause, a “strategic withdrawal” to regroup and resume their 1,000-year jihad.
I recall my conversation with Pakistani POWs in Ranchi after the 1971 victory. I had asked: How did you think you could ever defeat mighty India? Their reply still rings in my ears: We will wage a 1,000-year jihad to reclaim India as a Muslim nation.
Let me be clear—this is not paranoia. It is a stated ideological objective of Pakistan’s deep state.
My earnest plea to the Modi government is this: don’t mistake a tactical pause for strategic peace. Cross-border terror strikes and ISI-sponsored jihadists, even from Bangladesh, will continue.
At the very least, India must now demand the formal abrogation of the outdated Indus Waters Treaty—a relic that benefits Pakistan while India bleeds.
Hopefully, Modi and his team will not repeat the mistakes of Nehru, Shastri, or Indira Gandhi. Let the peace, if it must come, be on India’s terms—and in India’s long-term interest.
