How Bureaucratic Meddling Crippled India’s NIPERs

The Indian pharmaceutical education and research ecosystem has long been anchored by the National Institutes of Pharmaceutical Education and Research (NIPERs), established under the NIPER Act of 1998. These institutes were envisioned as centres of excellence, tasked with training high-quality professionals and driving innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. However, systemic lapses, bureaucratic interference, and questionable administrative decisions have seriously undermined the potential of these institutions.

One of the central figures in this web of dysfunction has been Mr. Rajneesh Tingal, former Joint Secretary in the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP), whose tenure has raised several red flags regarding transparency, governance, and institutional autonomy. I write this as someone who has served as the Director of NIPER Mohali and witnessed firsthand the deliberate obstructions and misrepresentations carried out under his watch.

Governance Structures Under the NIPER Act

All NIPERs are governed by the statutory framework laid down by the NIPER Act, 1998. As per this Act, the governance of these institutes rests with a Board of Governors, which includes representatives from the Department of Pharmaceuticals, notably the Joint Secretary and the Financial Advisor. This structure was intended to provide strategic oversight and ensure that national policy goals were being met without micromanaging operational decisions.

Yet, these representatives — particularly Mr. Rajneesh Tingal — have often failed in their fiduciary responsibilities. Rather than offering constructive oversight, Mr. Tingal frequently obstructed academic and administrative progress while turning a blind eye to serious procedural violations that occurred with his tacit or explicit presence.

Misleading Parliament: Manipulation of the 23rd Report

The most glaring example of Mr. Tingal’s bureaucratic misconduct lies in his role during the preparation of the 23rd Report (2020–21) of the Standing Committee on Chemicals & Fertilizers, presented to the 17th Lok Sabha in August 2021. The report contained multiple assertions that were not only misleading but contrary to the facts and legal framework.

On Page 19, point 3.28(a) stated:

“Board of Governors, NIPER Mohali had prescribed/enhanced the service conditions (retirement age) of faculty, which was not within its power.”

This statement is patently false. Any decision of such magnitude is not taken unilaterally. Board meetings are attended by 6–7 members, including two official nominees from the Department of Pharmaceuticals — the Joint Secretary (Mr. Tingal himself) and the Financial Advisor. If the Board truly acted beyond its mandate, as claimed, how did these senior DoP officials allow such a resolution to pass unchallenged? Why did they not record any dissent or raise concerns?

If this was indeed a violation of procedure, then why was no action taken against the Chairman of the Board of Governors, Dr. V. M. Katoch, who presided over two consecutive terms? Why target only the implementing officials while shielding those who were actually responsible for the policy decision?

Even more telling is point 3.28(b), which refers to a similar incident at NIPER Guwahati, where the Board passed a resolution enhancing the retirement age of the Director. Yet again, Mr. Tingal and the Financial Advisor were present at the meeting and remained silent. Their inaction raises serious questions: Was this deliberate? Was their silence a form of implicit approval? Or was it a calculated move to selectively enforce norms?

Double Standards and Institutional Sabotage

During my own tenure as Director of NIPER Mohali, I repeatedly requested an increase in faculty strength — a pressing need given the institute’s growing academic and research responsibilities. Yet these requests were systematically blocked by Mr. Tingal and the Financial Advisor without providing valid reasons. When I moved to implement the recommendations of the Rapid Grievance Redressal Committee, Mr. Tingal did not just oppose it — he actively worked for its disbandment in coordination with Dr. Katoch. This unholy nexus not only undermined administrative autonomy but also sent a chilling message to those attempting internal reform.

In contrast, when Dr. Katoch and the Board took questionable decisions such as enhancing the retirement age without mandatory departmental clearance, Mr. Tingal showed no inclination to challenge or question these acts. He never demanded accountability from Dr. Katoch, nor did he call for corrective action. This selective application of rules reflects an intent to target individuals rather than uphold institutional integrity.

Moreover, on point 3.28(d) of the Committee report, it was falsely alleged that I refused to implement a Board resolution relieving the Registrar. What Mr. Tingal conveniently failed to tell the Standing Committee is that the resolution itself was illegal. As per the NIPER Act and its Statutes, the Director is the Disciplinary Authority for all employees — a fact well within Mr. Tingal’s knowledge. Yet, he allowed a blatantly unlawful narrative to be passed off as truth before a parliamentary body.

Manufacturing the Case for an ‘Apex Council’

Adding to the list of troubling actions, Mr. Tingal reportedly misled the Standing Committee on the need for an Apex Council to govern all NIPERs — a centralized body that would, in effect, strip autonomy from individual institutes. By failing to present the ground realities, he created a distorted picture that legitimized more bureaucratic control over academic institutions. The justification for this move was based on misrepresented facts, and not on any genuine assessment of institutional needs or stakeholder consultations.

A Call for Accountability

The role of senior bureaucrats in shaping the future of premier institutions like NIPERs is too critical to be left unchecked. Mr. Rajneesh Tingal’s tenure exemplifies how bureaucratic overreach, misinformation, and selective enforcement can corrode governance structures from within.

It is time to ask difficult but necessary questions:

  • Why were rules enforced selectively and accountability deflected?
  • Why was a Director targeted for routine administrative decisions while others were protected despite serious violations?
  • Who benefits when institutions are destabilized through misinformation and administrative sabotage?

For the sake of India’s pharmaceutical education and research future, the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers and the Department of Pharmaceuticals must initiate an impartial probe into these allegations. The Standing Committee must also be apprised of the factual inaccuracies fed to it and take corrective action to ensure that its reports reflect ground realities, not bureaucratic maneuvering.

In conclusion, the vision of NIPER as a world-class institution will remain a mirage unless those entrusted with its stewardship are held accountable for their actions — or inaction.