Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar, a seasoned constitutional authority and a practicing lawyer before assuming high office, has sent a clear warning to India’s judiciary: do not exceed your brief. His caution comes at a time when the Supreme Court has been increasingly accused of judicial overreach, intruding into domains explicitly reserved for the legislature and the executive. This is not a minor squabble between institutions; it is a constitutional crisis in slow motion.
At the heart of Dhankhar’s concern is the Supreme Court’s recent conduct, particularly under Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and now Justice Rajiv Khanna, where it has repeatedly undermined elected governments and constitutional functionaries like the President and Governors. The most alarming instance is the apex court’s interpretation and invocation of Article 142, which empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary “for doing complete justice.” Originally meant to fill legal gaps or prevent a miscarriage of justice, it has now become a blunt instrument for judicial legislation and executive overrule.
The Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the ongoing Waqf Act hearings and in the case involving the Tamil Nadu Governor’s delay in clearing bills passed by the state assembly, are telling examples. In the latter, the Court virtually ordered the Governor to act in a specified timeframe, thereby reducing a constitutional office to that of a subordinate bureaucrat. But Article 163 and Article 200 clearly outline the Governor’s discretionary powers, especially in matters where he is expected to act independently or seek clarity. The Court, instead of interpreting the Constitution, appears to be rewriting it.
Even more alarming is the judiciary’s growing tendency to question the motives and processes of the executive without the burden of accountability. In doing so, it risks being perceived not as the neutral guardian of the Constitution, but as a self-appointed arbiter of governance—something that was never envisaged by the framers of the Constitution.
This moment of judicial overreach is also a symptom of a deeper malaise: the lack of accountability in judicial appointments. The Collegium system, a uniquely Indian creation with no constitutional or legal basis, has become a cabalistic and opaque mechanism of selecting judges. The Constitution under Articles 124 and 217 clearly entrusts the President—with consultation from the Chief Justice and other judges, as the appointing authority. The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), struck down by the same judiciary in 2015, was a legitimate effort by Parliament to restore balance. Its rejection remains a dark stain on judicial humility.
Dhankhar’s call for reform isn’t mere rhetoric—it reflects a growing public and political consensus that the judiciary must be brought back within its constitutional limits. Accountability cannot be a one-way street. Judges cannot enjoy immunity from scrutiny while wielding unchecked power. The judiciary’s insulation from politics must not become isolation from the Constitution itself.
Under the stewardship of Justice Rajiv Khanna, the Supreme Court seems determined to test the outer limits of its power. While his predecessors at least maintained a semblance of institutional restraint, the current regime seems to be rewriting conventions. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that CJI Khanna may go down in history as the face of judicial overreach—if reforms do not course-correct soon.
India’s democracy is built on a delicate balance of powers. When one branch starts to dominate, the entire constitutional edifice trembles. The time has come for Parliament to reassert its authority. Scrapping the Collegium, reviving the NJAC, defining limits to Article 142, and insulating constitutional authorities like the President and Governor from judicial micromanagement are essential steps to restore balance.
Vice President Dhankhar’s warning should not be dismissed as political posturing. It is, in fact, a call to action for preserving the sanctity of India’s constitutional architecture. If the judiciary cannot course-correct on its own, it is the solemn duty of the legislature and executive to do so, for the sake of democracy, and the people whose will they represent.
