As the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) marks a century of existence this year, it finds itself at a decisive crossroads in shaping both ideological narrative and political power. From its humble beginnings in 1925 as a cultural organization devoted to the Hindu renaissance, the Sangh has grown into a formidable socio-political force, influencing policies, institutions, and, above all, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Yet, as the 2024 Lok Sabha elections proved, even the most formidable alliances are susceptible to internal friction. The rift between the RSS and BJP—subtle but impactful—cost the latter dearly, to the tune of 40–50 Lok Sabha seats, forcing it to fall short of repeating its outright majority.
The numbers tell the story. The BJP emerged as the single largest party, but not with the emphatic dominance it enjoyed in 2014 and 2019. Behind this shortfall lies more than just anti-incumbency or opposition unity. It stemmed in large part from the silent, but telling, disaffection of the Sangh Parivar cadre. In several states, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh, swayamsevaks who had formed the BJP’s invisible electoral machine appeared less than enthusiastic.
Campaign mobilization was not as tight, booth management was not as disciplined, and the grassroots narrative not as persuasive. For the BJP, this was no small signal: the ideological mother ship was unhappy with what it saw as excessive centralization of power around Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a lack of space for traditional Sangh concerns such as social harmony, cadre development, and economic decentralization.
But politics, especially in India, rarely allows estrangement to last. Within weeks of the election results, the rapprochement began. Modi’s visit to the RSS headquarters at Nagpur was the first public gesture of bridge-building. Symbolically powerful, it reminded both cadres and critics that the relationship between the BJP and RSS is one of mutual dependence. Soon after, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat reciprocated with a visit to the Prime Minister’s official residence in New Delhi. The optics were unmistakable: the Sangh and the BJP had set aside their differences to prepare for the next battle.
That next battle is no less than existential. With assembly elections looming in Bihar and Tamil Nadu, the BJP knows it cannot afford to enter the fray with a demoralized cadre or a cold Sangh. Bihar, with its complex caste arithmetic, requires the quiet yet effective grassroots work of the RSS, particularly in consolidating non-Yadav OBCs and extremely backward classes.
Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, remains largely unconquered territory for the BJP, where the Sangh’s cultural outreach and network of schools and social organizations could provide an entry point. For both states, the RSS’s ability to mobilize, persuade, and spread ideological conviction is indispensable.
The reconciliation also carries institutional implications. The government is set to have yet another RSS man in a high constitutional office, with the possible elevation of Radhakrishnan, following in the footsteps of Venkaiah Naidu. This reflects not just the Sangh’s enduring influence in shaping the state but also the BJP leadership’s recognition that political legitimacy must be anchored in ideological continuity. For a cadre-driven movement like the BJP, losing the Sangh’s trust is akin to losing its foundational muscle.
Critics argue that the differences between the two organizations are overstated, pointing out that both share the same ideological DNA. But history shows that disagreements have always existed—be it over economic liberalization, caste reservation policies, or excessive personality cults.
The Sangh prefers a collective, understated leadership, while Modi’s brand of politics thrives on decisive, centralized authority. Reconciling these two approaches has never been easy, yet it has always been necessary. The 2024 results only re-emphasized the costs of neglecting the Sangh’s reservations.
As the RSS turns 100, its dual role becomes clearer than ever. On one hand, it remains a cultural organization, committed to character-building, social reform, and community service. On the other, it is undeniably the ideological compass and organizational backbone of the BJP, without which the party risks becoming just another political formation. For Modi, the lesson from 2024 is unambiguous: electoral charisma cannot replace organizational machinery, and machinery cannot function without ideological fuel.
The century mark is more than an anniversary; it is a reminder that the RSS, despite its deliberate distance from active politics, remains central to India’s political equation. Its relationship with the BJP will continue to oscillate between tension and symbiosis, yet both know they are bound by history and necessity.
The recent gestures of unity—Nagpur and Delhi, Modi and Bhagwat—are not mere courtesies; they signal a recalibration of a partnership that will shape Indian politics in the years ahead. Perhaps that explains why the Prime Minister chose to invoke the RSS from the Red Fort during his 79th Independence Day address—an acknowledgement that predictably drew criticism from a discredited Congress-led Opposition.
In short, RSS@100 is not merely about the past century of cultural awakening. It is about how this century-old institution still shapes the power politics of the world’s largest democracy—and how, despite differences, the Sangh and BJP must walk together, for neither can afford the costs of walking apart.
