India’s decision to speak firmly and openly for the welfare of the Bangladeshi people in the wake of the Tribunal Court’s death verdict against toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is more than a diplomatic posture—it is a statement of principles rooted in history, security, and regional stability. The question confronting New Delhi is straightforward: What kind of neighbourhood should India tolerate? A region shaped by democratically accountable governments, or one manipulated by backdoor coalitions installed through foreign-engineered manoeuvres? India, rightly, has chosen the former. To understand why this stance is neither emotional nor partisan but deeply strategic, we must step back to 1971. The genocide unleashed by the Pakistani military establishment on what was then East Pakistan remains one of the worst human tragedies in post-World War II Asia. Systematic killings, mass rapes, the decimation of the intellectual class, and a refugee wave of nearly ten million people into India created a humanitarian disaster that no responsible neighbour could ignore. Indira Gandhi’s government, after exhausting all diplomatic channels, took the correct and courageous decision to intervene. India did not go to war to capture territory; it went to stop a holocaust unfolding at its doorstep. The result was the emancipation of a new nation—Bangladesh—liberated from Pakistan’s brutality and free to shape its destiny. Half a century later, the echoes of that crisis seem to return. Sheikh Hasina, though no flawless leader, ensured stability and predictable governance. Importantly, from India’s security standpoint, she ensured that Bangladeshi territory was never used for anti-India insurgency or terror activities. Under her leadership, longstanding issues such as the land boundary dispute were finally resolved. Militant safe havens vanished. Cross-border coordination improved. Smuggling networks weakened. For the first time in decades, parts of India’s Northeast felt the tangible relief of a peaceful border. This is not a minor achievement—it is a structural shift. Against this backdrop, the sudden collapse of her government, the violent street-led uprising that forced her to flee, and the swift establishment of a new coalition propped up by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, with heavy Western diplomatic support, have raised legitimate concerns. This is not a transition born of consensus or electoral legitimacy but one crafted through external pressures and internal opportunism. The fact that Pakistan’s ISI chief rushed to Dhaka soon after the new dispensation settled in is not a coincidence; it is a signal.
Bangladesh may once again be drifting into the sphere of the very actors who once bled it—and India—mercilessly. The death verdict against Hasina only deepens these doubts. Delivered by a tribunal formed under a regime that gained power amid chaos, it hardly reflects the norms of due process. When a leader is ousted by politically motivated violence and then condemned by her rivals through a judiciary aligned with those very forces, it is difficult to call the outcome a genuinely judicial verdict. It bears the unmistakable imprint of political engineering. India, therefore, is justified in calling it out. What New Delhi is doing is not military intervention; it is political signalling. India is asserting that undemocratically installed governments should not expect normal relations. South Asia cannot afford to become the staging ground for Western regime experiments, nor can India permit its periphery to be influenced by Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. The security of 1.4 billion Indians and the stability of the region cannot be handed over to Nobel-winning technocrats with no mass mandate and questionable geopolitical judgment. Adding to these concerns, India’s Army Chief today issued a stern warning to Pakistan, making it clear that any revival of cross-border terrorism would be met with a decisive, overwhelming response. This warning, delivered at a moment when Bangladesh’s internal politics appear susceptible to Pakistani influence, is not accidental. It reflects India’s awareness that instability in Dhaka can quickly become instability in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and West Bengal—a cycle India has paid for in blood. India’s position is therefore not about Hasina the individual. It is about the architecture of peace in the subcontinent. Bangladesh drifting into the arms of Pakistan or becoming a laboratory for externally engineered coalitions is a threat to its own people and to India’s security. The democratic rights of Bangladeshis, their sovereignty, and their freedom from foreign manipulation are values India must uphold—not out of charity, but out of strategic necessity. By standing for democratic legitimacy and openly questioning a verdict that appears more political than judicial, India is sending a clear message: that its neighbourhood cannot be shaped by covert deals, foreign interference, or hostile intelligence networks. Bangladesh’s people deserve better. And India is right—morally, historically, and strategically—to say so.
