Marri Shashidhar Reddy
Union Home Minister Amit Shah recently observed that anti-Naxalite operations suffered a serious setback after the Supreme Court’s July 5, 2011 judgement delivered by Justice B. Sudershan Reddy, which disbanded Salwa Judum — the controversial people’s movement backed by the Chhattisgarh government with central assistance.
This remark has triggered a storm. A group of 18 retired judges criticised Shah’s statement as “unfortunate” and warned that such “prejudicial misinterpretations” could undermine judicial independence. But their intervention was soon countered by 56 other retired judges, including two former Chief Justices of India, P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi. They accused their peers of “cloaking political partisanship under the language of judicial independence,” warning that such actions damage the judiciary’s credibility.
I am not a lawyer and will not enter the domain of legal hair-splitting. But having studied Naxalism closely for decades, I can testify to the practical realities that framed this debate.
The Vajpayee government had recognized the two-pronged challenge of development and security. In 1998, then Home Minister L.K. Advani spoke of the need for accelerated development combined with strong security measures. The Planning Commission’s Sam Vikas Yojana was launched in 2002, covering 147 backward districts — over 50 of which were severely affected by Naxalite violence.
In 2004, I was appointed Convenor of a National Task Force on Naxalite Violence to study the issue in depth and recommend policy responses. Former Chhattisgarh CM Ajit Jogi, MP and former Special Secretary (Security) Nikhil Kumar, and several experts were members. We submitted our report in January 2005.
Meanwhile, in Chhattisgarh, Salwa Judum emerged in 2005, spearheaded by Congress MLA Mahendra Karma. What began as a spontaneous mobilisation of tribals against Maoists evolved into a state-backed militia. Its cadre of Special Police Officers (SPOs), drawn from local youth, gave security forces invaluable intelligence and operational support in terrain unfamiliar to outsiders.
It is worth recalling the shifting position of the UPA government. In 2008, Home Minister P. Chidambaram told the Rajya Sabha he was “not in favour of non-state actors.” Yet, in 2009, while addressing Chief Ministers of seven Naxal-affected states, he admitted SPOs played a “useful role” and should be appointed wherever required. Again, in August 2011, after the Supreme Court verdict, he acknowledged that SPOs brought skills and knowledge that regular forces lacked.
This duplicity reveals an inconvenient truth: the utility of SPOs was acknowledged even by those who later distanced themselves from Salwa Judum.
When Justice Sudershan Reddy’s bench struck down Salwa Judum in 2011, many within the government were deeply dismayed. Shah’s blunt assertion — “Had the Supreme Court not banned Salwa Judum, Naxalism would have ended by 2020” — is not mere political rhetoric.
Consider what followed:
- July 20, 2011 — Barely two weeks after the judgement, Naxals blew up a bridge in Gariyabandh, targeting Chhattisgarh Congress chief Nand Kumar Patel.
- May 25, 2013 — The Darbha Valley massacre claimed 27 lives, including Patel himself, his son, former Union Minister V.C. Shukla, and Mahendra Karma, the architect of Salwa Judum. Karma was singled out, brutally stabbed, riddled with 58 bullets, and mocked as Maoists danced around his body.
These atrocities emboldened Maoists, who regrouped with renewed strength. Instead of containment, the insurgency escalated. The trajectory of India’s fight against Left-wing extremism was irreversibly altered.
The reality is stark: Salwa Judum, for all its flaws, disrupted Maoist dominance and gave security forces the eyes and ears they lacked. Its abrupt disbandment deprived the state of critical local intelligence and combat support.
History cannot be rewritten. But recorded facts do support Shah’s view — that the 2011 verdict derailed the momentum against Naxalism, prolonging the insurgency, costing countless lives, and leaving an unfinished war that might otherwise have been concluded. (The author is former Vice Chairman of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Chairman of the BJP Telangana State Election Commission Affairs Committee)
