Echoes of 1971

History has a way of circling back. When President Richard Nixon insulted Indira Gandhi in 1971, armed Pakistan to the teeth, and courted China, he imagined India could be intimidated. Instead, India forged the Indo-Soviet Treaty and emerged victorious in the liberation of Bangladesh. Today, under President Donald Trump’s erratic hand, we see troubling shades of that same Washington arrogance. Trump, ever the showman, has been playing “hot and cold” with India. One week he slaps tariffs on Indian exports, the next he offers trade concessions. Then, in a move reeking of déjà vu, he hosts Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asim Munir at back-to-back White House banquets. The whispers are not hard to decipher: Washington is eyeing Pakistan’s minerals in Balochistan—copper, gold, lithium—along with its potential as a cryptocurrency hub. The US establishment may dress this up as “strategic reset,” but the truth is clear: Pakistan is once again being courted for America’s narrow economic ambitions. India cannot afford complacency. A transactional Trump is not a trustworthy partner. What he offers with one hand, he takes away with the other. This is the same Trump who lauds India’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific but cozies up to Islamabad behind closed doors. The same Trump who courts Modi on stage in Houston but leaves New Delhi guessing on defence technology transfers. Washington’s unpredictability is no longer a diplomatic quirk; it is a strategic liability. For New Delhi, the lesson of 1971 is critical. When Nixon chose Pakistan and China, India refused to beg. Indira Gandhi turned to Moscow and asserted India’s autonomy. Modi must adopt a similar stance: engage America where interests align, but prepare to walk alone if Washington backslides. Strategic autonomy cannot remain a slogan—it must be exercised. Nowhere is this more urgent than in defence manufacturing. India’s reliance on US fighter jet engines for HAL’s Tejas Mk2 and future AMCA jets is a dangerous vulnerability. A single Trump tantrum could freeze transfers overnight. India must diversify—tap into France, Britain, and Japan, while accelerating indigenous engine development. National security should not be hostage to a leader’s mood swings in Washington.

But the bigger question looms: what if India, China, and Russia, weary of Western double standards, decide to write a new world order? Already, BRICS is expanding, de-dollarization is creeping forward, and Moscow-Beijing coordination is deepening. If New Delhi too joins hands in shaping a multipolar architecture, America’s leverage will shrink dramatically. And in such a realignment, what happens to Pakistan—the supposed darling of Washington’s short-term strategies? The reality is stark: Pakistan is a brittle state, propped up by foreign aid and fractured from within. Baloch separatists grow bolder by the day. Sindh murmurs with resentment. Pashtuns eye Kabul more than Islamabad. The Taliban-run Afghanistan, emboldened after America’s humiliating retreat, has already hinted at denying the US access to its airports despite Washington’s threats. If Pakistan unravels into three or four entities—Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, and Pashtun regions—the US may huff and puff, but it will be powerless to stop the tide. In that scenario, America’s cynical embrace of Islamabad will look like yet another historic miscalculation. Trump may chase lithium in Balochistan, but what if that Balochistan rises as an independent nation hostile to American diktats? He may threaten Kabul over airports, but what if the Taliban, buoyed by Chinese and Russian backing, simply slams the door? The geopolitics of South Asia is shifting faster than Washington dares to admit. India stands at a crossroads. It cannot and should not bet its future on a fickle White House. Instead, it must strengthen its own economy, build defence self-reliance, deepen regional influence, and—where interests align—work with other emerging powers to rewrite the global order. America will always matter, but America will not always dominate. Trump may imagine he can replay Nixon’s 1971 script. But this time, India under Narendra Modi’s leadership is not the hesitant regional player of half a century ago. It is a civilizational state, a rising global economy, and a decisive actor—one that Modi repeatedly frames in his vision of a Viksit Bharat by 2047. He is equally blunt about Atmanirbhar Bharat, pushing Indian industry toward indigenous manufacturing with active state backing. Many believe Modi is far more stubborn than Indira Gandhi and will not allow Trump to bully India—something already evident in the way he has handled him, subtly snubbing invitations and paying him back in his own coin. If Washington cannot respect that, New Delhi seems ready to chart its own course—and perhaps draft a new script for the world.