More than four years after the bloody Galwan clashes that marked the lowest point in Sino-Indian ties since the 1962 war, there is now a glimmer of pragmatism in Beijing. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), once eager to test India’s resolve in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, appears to have sobered up. India has changed—and China knows it. Unlike in the past, when weak-willed leadership in New Delhi allowed repeated incursions and diplomatic capitulations, today’s India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has redefined its posture—militarily, economically, and diplomatically. The era of appeasement and strategic ambiguity is over. New Delhi speaks in the language of self-confidence and national interest, a far cry from the Congress-led decades marked by dithering and dependence. The contrast is stark. The 1962 war found India unprepared, strategically naive, and diplomatically isolated. But in the decades since—particularly post-1991 liberalization initiated by P.V. Narasimha Rao, India’s first truly reformist leader not beholden to dynastic politics—the country has evolved into a formidable force. The transformation accelerated under Modi, whose governance model, focus on Atmanirbharta (self-reliance), and assertive foreign policy have significantly enhanced India’s standing in the world. India’s pandemic response is just one illustration. While COVID-19 brought much of the world to its knees, India not only contained the crisis domestically but also emerged as a vaccine manufacturing and distribution powerhouse. More than 150 countries, including Western giants, benefited from India’s homegrown vaccines. That is the face of the new India—resilient, resourceful, and responsible. China, on the other hand, faces serious internal and external challenges. Its economy, once a miracle story, now shows signs of structural strain. Youth unemployment is soaring, growth is sluggish, and global mistrust is rising due to its aggressive posture in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the Himalayas. Its Belt and Road Initiative, once touted as a grand strategic masterstroke, is now mired in a debt diplomacy backlash. The time is ripe for a fundamental rethink in Beijing.
External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s upcoming visit to China—his first bilateral visit since the 2020 standoff—could be a crucial inflection point. He is expected to meet Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) ministerial summit in Tianjin. The visit comes ahead of the SCO leaders’ summit in September, to which Prime Minister Modi has also been invited. The significance is not lost on anyone. Since the disengagement agreement in 2023, both sides have maintained fragile calm, but deep mistrust remains. India has consistently called for full disengagement and de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as well as restoration of bilateral ties in trade, tourism, and cultural exchange. The revival of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and China’s keenness to resume direct flights and boost trade are signs of a possible thaw. Yet, Beijing’s double game continues. On one hand, it seeks trade normalization with India; on the other, it continues to shield Pakistan, a globally recognized haven for terrorism. China’s refusal to condemn the Pahalgam terror attack, in which 26 Indian tourists were massacred, is both morally indefensible and diplomatically shortsighted. No responsible power can simultaneously talk peace while protecting perpetrators of terror. Moreover, China must reconcile with the fact that India today is no pushover. Its military strength is bolstered by advanced air defence systems, indigenously developed BrahMos missiles, and cutting-edge drone warfare capabilities. The Chinese-Turkish drone alliance has failed to make an impact, while India’s defence partnerships with Russia, Israel, and the West have matured strategically. The recent successes of India’s aerospace and defence sectors point to a country that is no longer import-dependent but innovation-driven. This should prompt a serious recalibration in Beijing. An Asia led by cooperation, not confrontation, is the need of the hour. Instead of aligning with rogue states and pursuing hegemonic fantasies, China should consider building a trilateral axis with India and Russia—an economic, technological, and strategic counterweight to the West. Such a coalition need not be militaristic; it could become a stabilizing force for global peace and multipolarity. Ultimately, China must decide: does it want to be a partner in progress or a prisoner of past hostility? The road ahead offers two paths—escalation, which risks economic ruin and diplomatic isolation, or reconciliation, which could unlock immense regional and global potential. It is time Beijing choose wisely. That’s why Beijing must abandon adventurism and embrace a stable Asian order.
