The buzz around restoring statehood to Jammu & Kashmir is growing louder. Union Home Ministry officials have hinted at a “concrete announcement” by the end of this year—perhaps around Independence Day or in the run-up to other key state elections. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, who returned to power on the back of a strong mandate, is already pressing for full statehood, citing the Centre’s assurance to the Supreme Court during the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A. But the question remains: should the Centre rush into restoring statehood, without setting strict conditions? Absolutely not. The demand for statehood cannot be treated as a political transaction or a token of goodwill. J&K is not just another Indian state—it is a border state that has witnessed three decades of bloodshed, secessionist propaganda, cross-border terrorism, and ideological ambivalence from within. The political climate in the Valley, historically shaped by parties like the National Conference (NC) and the People’s Democratic Front (PDF), has never inspired national confidence. If anything, their selective outrage, silence on Pakistan’s interference, and past flirtations with separatist sympathies make it clear: unqualified statehood will be a strategic blunder. Let us not forget history. The Congress-NC alliance under Farooq Abdullah was in power when the Kashmiri Pandit genocide unfolded in the early 1990s—a dark chapter still awaiting justice. That same political establishment repeatedly played footsie with Pakistan-backed militant groups in the name of reconciliation. Today, while peace has largely returned and development is taking root under the Union Territory (UT) model, there is no credible public assurance that these old political forces have reformed. Should the same actors, with unchanged ideologies, be handed the reins again?
The Centre did promise statehood in the Supreme Court. Yes, but that promise was not without implied caveats—chief among them being national security, institutional stability, and electoral accountability. A full return to pre-2019 status would be reckless. The better approach is a phased and conditional restoration, much like the governance structure of Delhi, where the Centre retains control over law and order. J&K deserves no less vigilance. Let’s also be clear about the term “restoration.” If statehood returns, it must not be a blank cheque. It must come with a detailed roadmap: clarity on administrative structure, timelines for legislative elections, safeguards against political misuse of state machinery, and constitutional limits on any special treatment. There should be no ambiguity this time—no space for the manipulation of federal structures, no leeway for backroom separatist appeasement, and no compromise on national unity. There are two plausible models being discussed. One, where the current administration (elected under UT status) completes its full term and then transitions into a statehood model for the next elections. Two, a more immediate restoration that dissolves the present government and calls for fresh elections under full statehood, complete with the reinstated legislative council, cabinet, and constitutionally empowered Chief Minister. The second model appears more democratic—but only if backed by rigorous vetting of candidates, an enforceable code of conduct, and continued Centre oversight of law enforcement and intelligence. Let’s be blunt: we cannot afford another security lapse or political compromise in the name of “restoring dignity.” Critics call this approach a “delayed dignity” model. So be it. In a region as sensitive and strategically critical as J&K, dignity must be earned through accountability, not demanded as entitlement. The people of Jammu & Kashmir deserve democratic empowerment—but not at the cost of national integrity. Statehood must return, yes—but only with conditions that safeguard the Republic from past mistakes. Let the Centre tread carefully. The fine print matters.
